Santa Clara Journal of International Law
Volume 13 | Issue 1

Article 1

4-2-2015

Symposium Introduction
Tseming Yang
Santa Clara University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil
Recommended Citation
Tseming Yang, Other, Symposium Introduction, 13 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 1 (2015).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol13/iss1/1

This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Symposium Introduction

Symposium
Introduction
Tseming Yang*


*

Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. I am grateful to Yorum
Choe and Devani Adams for their valuable assistance.

1

13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2015)

In recent years, the relationship between international human rights law and
the environment has seen a rapid evolution. The high visibility of transnational
and global environmental challenges, and the severe impacts they impose upon
vulnerable groups—including women, children, and indigenous people—has led
activists to bring both human rights and environmental law to bear on problems
ranging from climate change to soil and water pollution from mineral exploration
activities, as well as other contemporary environmental issues. Matters are being
heard before domestic courts and international human rights bodies, such as the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the European Court of
Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights.
In a series of resolutions, the U.N. Human Rights Council has drawn attention
to this interrelationship, and in 2008, it appointed an independent expert on the
human right to water—a right that was explicitly recognized by the U.N. General
Assembly two years later.1 In 2012, the U.N. Human Rights Council appointed
John Knox, a U.S. law professor, as an Independent Expert on Human Rights and
the Environment.2
These developments have raised awareness of how
fundamental the environment is as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of human
rights.
For Santa Clara University School of Law, developments in the fields of human
rights law and environmental law are of especially great interest. Santa Clara
Law’s International Human Rights Clinic has been working on international
human rights litigation and advocacy projects, including those that link to
environmental quality, while providing a unique educational opportunity for
students to gain practical experience at the intersection of the two fields.
Moreover, Professor Dinah Shelton, the preeminent scholarly voice on human
rights and the environment and former member and chair of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, served on the faculty of Santa Clara Law while
conducting some of her early seminal work on these issues.
It is in this context that on January 24-25, 2014, the Santa Clara University
Center for Global Law and Policy and the Santa Clara Journal of International
Law co-hosted a symposium on the “Environment and Human Rights.” The
symposium included a keynote address by Professor Dinah Shelton; four main
papers by Professors Rebecca Bratspies, Maxine Burkett, Carmen Gonzalez, and
Rebecca Tsosie, and commentaries on these papers by a distinguished group of
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leading scholars and practitioners dedicated to human rights and the environment.
The event was co-sponsored by Santa Clara University’s Markkula Center for
Applied Ethics and the American Society of International Law.
This Symposium issue of the Journal presents an insightful and thoughtprovoking collection of articles exploring and addressing the interrelationship
between human rights and the environment. Professor Shelton and Professor
Bratspies’ articles focus directly on the intersection of human rights and the
environment, examining its development and analyzing current understandings.
Articles by Professor Burkett, Professor Gonzalez, and Professor Tsosie inquire
into specific topics that are profoundly affected by human rights and
environmental law analysis, such as climate change compensation, the
relationship between industrialized nations and the developing world, and
restorative justice for radioactive contamination of the lands of indigenous people.
This collection of articles directly advances a better understanding of current
issues and develops solutions based on masterful insights from leading thinkers at
the cutting edge of the field.
Professor Shelton’s essay, Whiplash and Backlash—Reflections on a Human
Rights Approach to Environmental Protection, is both a reflection on the evolution
of the field and an assessment of its present state and future direction. Presented
as the keynote speech for the symposium, the essay provides both provocative
insight into the views of the leading scholar on the jurisprudential evolution of the
human rights and the environment linkage, and the personal observations of an
individual directly engaged in the field’s most pressing issues. Professor Shelton’s
historical perspective on the role of human rights issues in the origins of modern
international environmental law gives readers crucial context for present day
prospects. She informs us that while a human rights perspective on environmental
problems evolved rapidly, especially through the incorporation of a right to a
healthy environment into American state and foreign national constitutions,
jurisprudential development slowed significantly due to political backlash, arising
in significant part out of perceived conflicts of such concerns with economic
development priorities of nations.3 Currently, evolution of a rights-based approach
to the environment is continuing, but at a more measured pace. However, both
environmental and human rights jurisprudence benefit from a better
understanding of the interrelationship between environmental quality and human
wellbeing. Professor Shelton concludes that the two fields not only overlap in their
substantive concerns, but are in fact jurisprudentially interconnected and linked,
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each informing and providing form and content for the other.4
Professor Bratspies’ contribution, Do We Need A Human Right to a Healthy
Environment?, explores the theoretical underpinnings of this topic. Specifically,
her article explores why human rights norms and analyses are increasingly
invoked in the environmental policy context, and finds reasons in the
“unconditional normative value and immediate applicability”5 of human rights
norms as well as their “timelessness, absoluteness, and universal validity.”6 Yet,
the article reminds us that the lure of human rights discourse finds limitations in
the substance of domestic and international environmental law. Efforts to use
human rights norms to achieve environmental objectives encounter similar
opportunities and challenges. Professor Bratspies posits that two premises are key
to understanding the relationship between the fields: (1) environmental quality is a
precondition to the fulfillment of human rights; and (2) human rights norms can be
an important tool for improving and protecting the environment.7 However, she
concludes that this approach is limited in its effectiveness since some
environmental concerns do not even involve humans8 and the approach is
“inherently fragmented and episodic.”9 Accordingly, she argues that a new
approach “that recognizes the right to a safe and healthy environment as an
independent substantive human right”10 is both called for and is in fact emerging.
Finally, Professor Bratspies identifies private actors, such as transnational
corporations, as raising important concerns in this context. Her article identifies
the nature of corporations as creations of the state, pointing to the authority of
states to extend human rights obligations to such non-state actors, and creating a
path for holding them accountable in the international legal framework.11 She
concludes that the human right to a healthy environment approach is already
making impacts in “legal, constitutional, and political cultures of many states, and
of international institutions.”12
In his commentary on Professor Bratspies’ article, Dr. Marcos Orellana offers
the perspective of a leading practitioner in international human rights and
environmental law. He notes that Professor Bratspies’ article identifies one of the
fundamental tensions between the two fields: that human rights law establishes
4.
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limits “on state sovereignty by affirming the international community’s interest in
their promotion and effective enjoyment,” while “environmental policy is premised
on the sovereign rights of states.”13 This and other differences impose significant
limitations on existing approaches to human rights and the environment, making
a free-standing right to a healthy environment a necessity. He also calls for
answers to questions about the fundamental content of such a right, as well as for
more effective implementation of the environmental dimension of existing human
rights. Dr. Orellana believes that the synthesis of the two fields will eventually
give rise to a “rights-based approach to environmental policy” that can serve as a
valuable tool for overcoming “the global politicization of the environment.”14 His
commentary advises that even though progress of the field continues, including
through calls for recognition of the right to a healthy environment at the recent
Rio+20 conference, meeting outcomes have failed to establish a framework for a
rights-based approach to sustainable development—the ultimate prize for a
synthesis of the two fields.15 Nevertheless, Dr. Orellana advises that further
progress in human rights and the environment will be likely, given the support of
various countries and in light of the field’s ultimate value for achieving sustainable
development.16
Professor Burkett’s paper, Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate
Compensation Mechanism for Small Island States, examines the proposal for a
Small Islands Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission (CRC).17
Championed by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to address the special
adverse impacts of climate change on small island developing states, the CRC has
been proposed as a multi-pronged insurance mechanism to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC). Its structure would consist
of: (1) an insurance component that would “manage financial risk from
increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather events in a timely manner;”18
(2) a rehabilitation and compensation component that “would address ‘progressive
negative impacts of climate change;’”19 and (3) a risk management component that
“would facilitate and inform the prior two components by supporting and

13.
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Marcos Orellana, Reflections on the Right to a Healthy Environment: Comments On Rebecca
Bratspies' Do We Need A Human Right To A Healthy Environment?, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L.
71, 72 (2015).
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 76-77.
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promoting risk assessment and management tools.”20 Professor Burkett’s paper
carefully examines the proposal, which was originally based on a life-insurance
model, but ultimately concludes that an insurance-based approach may not be
workable.21 Instead, she submits that the mechanism will need to resemble a
compensation mechanism, much like the one found in the United Nations
Compensation Commission (UNCC), a commission set up to address the claims
against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait and the resulting environmental damage.22
The CRC would ideally rely on the experiences and lessons learned from the
UNCC as a guide for the establishment of such a new institution. Professor
Burkett’s article closes with a discussion of guiding principles, questions of how
substantive compensation decisions would be made, and potential structural
arrangements for the mechanism.23
Both Professor Randall Abate’s and Dr. Damilola Olawuyi’s responses agree
with Professor Burkett’s CRC as a valuable conceptual tool for achieving climate
justice; however, the commentators contend that such a proposal would encounter
significant implementation difficulties. Professor Abate’s commentary approaches
the topic by raising issues such as (1) which nations should be able to take
advantage of the compensation mechanism, (2) how should damages be quantified
for compensation purposes, and (3) how should the practical difficulties of ensuring
funding and political support for a new international institution be overcome.24
Dr. Olawuyi’s commentary engages the challenges of establishing and
administering the CRC through a set of four similar questions: (1) would the
current set of professionals and organizations involved in climate change policy
have the capacity to implement a compensation mechanism; (2) how should one
manage or limit the number of claimants to the fund, so as not to overwhelm
available resources; (3) what is its relationship with existing climate change
institutions such as the Kyoto compliance mechanism; and (4) how can one ensure
the integrity and accountability of the claims process.25 In the end, the two
respondents arrive at differing conclusions about the practicality of a compensation
mechanism. Professor Abate believes that the UNCC is not likely to work as a
model for designing a climate change compensation mechanism, and suggests
instead, that funding for small island nations be directly channeled to adaptation

20.
21.
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and relocation efforts.26 Dr. Olawuyi also acknowledges great challenges to
making the compensation mechanism a reality, but concludes that its strategic
importance should prompt a fine-tuning of the approach to address the practical
implementation challenges presented.27
The third article in this collection, Professor Gonzalez’s Environment Justice,
Human Rights, and the Global South, presents the historical and economic context
of environmental injustice between nations and articulates the limitations of
human rights discourse for providing a satisfactory solution. Explaining the
colonial roots of current economic and environmental injustice, Professor Gonzalez
argues that traditional international law discourse has been used both to justify
colonial relationships in the past, as well as to continue unequal economic
relationships, especially the international dominance by industrialized nations,
into the present.28 Even though human rights jurisprudence holds significant
potential for advancing environmental objectives and vice versa, she contends that
human rights law contains significant limitations for achieving environmental
justice.29 In her exploration of these issues, Professor Gonzalez expands on some of
the points raised by Professor Bratspies, but also notes, for example, how the
existing human rights discourse has failed to address historic injustices and
economic inequity or reign in the role of transnational corporations in human
rights abuses.30 Instead of accepting these problems as deficiencies that render the
combination of environment and human rights ineffective, she suggests accepting
the utility of the human rights framework for environmental analysis, adding that
local visions of human dignity can inform the right to a healthy environment and
help overcome such limitations.31 Ultimately, Professor Gonzalez concludes that
“human rights law and institutions are embedded in power relations that replicate
colonial discourses,”32 but they also possess “tremendous emancipatory potential . .
. to advocate for a more equitable and sustainable society.”33
Professor Sumudu Atapattu’s commentary on Professor Gonzalez’s article
echoes the scholar’s key assertions. However, she highlights additional issues that
could have been raised by the article, especially whether the critique of human
rights discourse applies uniformly to all forms of human rights norms despite their

26.
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Abate, supra note 24, at 130.
Olawuyi, supra note 25, at 147-49.
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multifaceted nature, ranging from the procedural to the substantive.34 Other
issues that Professor Atapattu raises include the growing relevance of matters
such as the Ruggie Principles and the rights of nature.35
With Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation: Redressing the Legacy
of Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and Native Lands, Professor
Tsosie explores the ramifications of achieving reparative justice for native peoples
seeking redress for environmental harms to themselves and their lands. Her
paper focuses on the legacy of radioactive contamination associated with uranium
mining affecting the Navajo Nation and parallels in the experiences of indigenous
people on the Marshall Islands with the consequences of nuclear weapons
testing.36
Professor Tsosie’s comparative examination of these two native
experiences examines not only the limitations of available legal tools to the Navajo
Nation, but also shows the significant disparity in ultimate outcomes. Even
though both native peoples have had analogous trust relationships with the United
States government, the people of the Marshall Islands were ultimately able to
obtain a far more generous and appropriate reparations package than what was
provided to the Navajo Nation.37 Her comparative analysis reveals important
parallels of attaining individualized justice in such situations.
Based on the deficiencies of contemporary legal remedies, the special status of
native peoples, and their unique trust relationship with the federal government,
Professor Tsosie develops a framework for reparative justice due to indigenous
people that seeks to capture both material compensation needs as well as the
“intangible, psychological” component of grave injustices.38 This framework,
“ethics of remediation,” looks not only to the past as relevant, but also to the
present and future, and the attendant moral relationship between the parties.39 In
other words, she argues that an ethics of remediation requires not only the redress
of physical harms, but also the repair of moral, spiritual, and dignitary injuries, as
well as acknowledgment of the interconnection of the past to the present and
future. Looking to the remediation efforts in the South Pacific suggests an
intercultural component for the Navajo, meaning that “an ethics of remediation
should be based on a platform of mutual respect, honoring Indigenous self-

34.
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determination and the protective aspects of the federal trust responsibility.”40
Professor Kronk Warner’s essay Working to Protect the Seventh Generation:
Indigenous Peoples as Agents of Change builds on and extends Professor Tsosie’s
ethics of remediation framework to climate change issues. Through Professor
Kronk Warner’s exploration, indigenous people can play a special role in
implementing climate solutions through their special sovereign status, connection
to the environment, and distinct experiences. She proposes that these special
characteristics can allow indigenous peoples to serve as agents of change with a
unique view on environmental issues from a human rights perspective.41 Professor
Kronk Warner also asserts that the indigenous people’s role in human rights and
the environment can showcase that restorative justice requires legal as well as
moral redress that tells their stories for the achievement of justice.42
Professor Robert Coulter’s The Situation of the Indigenous People of Rapa Nui
and International Law: Reflections on Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of
Remediation applies Professor Tsosie’s ideas to the people of Rapa Nui, a small
island west of Chile. Their difficulties have included not only lack of selfdetermination and rapid immigration from Chile, but also disintegration of their
access to sacred and protected sites.43
Professor Coulter suggests that
environmental protection concerns can be used as a tool for achieving an ethics of
remediation in international human rights law, including in the struggles of the
people of Rapa Nui for self-determination and redressing of wrongs.44
Overall, the Symposium articles illustrate the broad range of issues found at the
intersection of human rights and the environment. The expert scholarship
challenges us to be ambitious and engage in further inquiry and research. Policymakers, activists, and scholars will have to work hard to integrate the legal
frameworks, core values, and objectives of environmental law and international
human rights law effectively. Although the appropriate relationship and role of
politics vis-à-vis legal principles remains to be identified, institutions in both fields
must become more effective in implementing existing law. The potential
contribution toward advancing human rights and environmental quality could be
great.

40.
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